IP & Network Utilities

New: Network & Abuse Contact Finder — who to contact about an IP, ASN or domain

Enter an IP address, AS number or domain and get the published abuse, security, NOC, registrar and peering contacts — each with its source and how authoritative it is. Registry contacts of individual people are never shown.

By NetTools.tech · · 5 min read

Your mail server is being hammered from an address you have never seen. A phishing page imitates your company's login. A scanner on the other side of the world keeps probing your firewall. In every case the first practical question is the same: who do I tell?

The answer exists — networks, registries and website owners publish contacts precisely for this — but it is scattered across several systems. The new Network & Abuse Contact Finder collects it for you: enter an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6), an AS number, a domain or a hostname, and it shows the published abuse, security, NOC, registrar and peering contacts, each with the source it came from.

Where the contacts come from

The tool only uses sources that exist to publish operational contacts:

  • The regional internet registry's abuse contact for the network or AS, via RIPEstat. It names the responsible registry for every address; for some networks — in our tests, addresses in the LACNIC and AFRINIC regions — it has no abuse address, and the RDAP record below is then the source.
  • RDAP records of the IP network, the AS number and the domain — the modern, structured successor of WHOIS. For a domain this includes the registrar's abuse contact, which registrars accredited by ICANN must publish.
  • PeeringDB, where networks publish their own NOC, technical and peering-policy contacts.
  • security.txt (RFC 9116), the file a website uses to say where vulnerability reports should go.
  • DMARC report addresses and the DNS SOA mailbox of the domain.

Every contact carries one of three labels, so you can judge how much weight it deserves:

LabelMeaningExamples
Verified / authoritativeFrom registry dataRIR abuse contact, RDAP role contacts, registrar abuse contact
Published by targetWhat the network or site publishes itselfsecurity.txt, PeeringDB, DMARC
Inferred / derivedRead from a record that is not meant as a contactthe SOA "responsible mailbox"

A real example: ripe.net

Here is what the tool returned for ripe.net on 23 October 2026. The page first shows how it got from the input to the contacts:

ripe.net → registrar Gandi SAS → 193.0.11.51 → 193.0.10.0/23 → AS3333 → RIPE NCC → 12 contacts

The primary contacts cards then answer the common questions directly:

  • Abuse: the RIPE NCC abuse mailbox ([email protected]), confirmed independently by RIPEstat's abuse-contact finder and by the RIPE database's RDAP record — labelled Verified / authoritative.
  • Security: [email protected], from the site's own security.txt — Published by target.
  • Registrar abuse: the abuse contact of Gandi, the registrar of the domain, from the .net registry's RDAP server.

Further down, the contact availability matrix shows which source supplied which role — 9 sources were asked, 8 had something — and the full table lists the remaining contacts, including a DMARC report address at an external reporting service and the SOA mailbox, both clearly marked as not general-purpose contacts.

One line deserves attention: 18 registry contacts of individual people were not shown. The RIPE database lists named staff as technical and administrative contacts. The Contact Finder deliberately leaves out every contact the registry marks as an individual person and only counts them. You get the role mailboxes and organisations that are meant to be contacted, not people's names.

Which contact to use

The tool is most useful when you pick the right contact for the problem:

  • Spam, attacks, scanning or a compromised host → the abuse contact of the network the traffic comes from. For an IP address this is usually the first card.
  • A phishing or malware domain → the registrar abuse contact. The registrar can suspend the domain itself, whoever hosts it.
  • A vulnerability in a website → the security.txt contact, if the site publishes one.
  • Routing or connectivity problems → the NOC contact.
  • Peering requests → the peering / policy contact from PeeringDB.

When you look up a domain, keep in mind that the network contacts belong to whoever hosts the domain's address — often a hosting provider or a CDN rather than the site owner. The tool says so in a note on the result. For a CDN-fronted site, the hosting network's abuse team can act on abuse from its network but will not answer questions about the site.

This tool replaces the "People Search" that was planned for NetTools. We decided not to build a search for people: the large platforms do not offer one through their APIs, the alternatives would mean scraping or buying data from brokers, and a name search across sites is exactly the kind of tool that is misused for stalking.

The Contact Finder is the useful part of that idea without the harm. It does not search social networks or search engines, does not combine sources into a profile of anyone, and never shows registry contacts of individual people. It only finds contacts that were published so that someone would use them for this purpose.

The details

  • Sources and freshness: every source is listed with its result — found, not found, unavailable or rate limited — when it was retrieved and a link to the original. If one source does not answer, the others are still shown.
  • Export: copy, JSON, CSV and a print-friendly report, with the source of every contact and the retrieval times.
  • Shareable: the query is kept in the address bar (/contact-finder?q=…), so a colleague can open the same lookup.
  • Read-only: the tool only queries RDAP servers listed by IANA, RIPEstat, PeeringDB, public DNS and the target's own /.well-known/security.txt. Reports are not saved; the public answers of those sources are cached briefly.

Limits

  • No abuse contact is perfect: some mailboxes are slow or unmonitored, and the tool cannot tell you which ones are.
  • Registrant data of domains is redacted by most registries, so the domain owner itself is usually not listed — the registrar is.
  • Contacts depend on what was published. A network without a PeeringDB record or a site without security.txt simply has fewer entries.

Try it

Open the Network & Abuse Contact Finder and look up an address from your firewall log — or your own domain, to see what others find when they need to reach you. The guide explains every field and source in detail.