Tool guideNetwork Diagnostics

RPKI Validator – Complete Guide to ROA Checks, Route Origin Validation and ASPA

What ROAs and ASPA records are, how the NetTools.tech RPKI Validator checks route origins and AS paths against a local rpki-client dataset, and how to fix INVALID routes.

By NetTools.tech · · 6 min read

A customer reports that your new prefix is unreachable from some networks but fine from others. The cause is often RPKI: an old ROA that authorises a different origin AS, or a maxLength that does not allow the more-specific prefix you just started announcing. Networks that enforce route origin validation silently drop such routes, and everyone else still carries them — so the problem only shows up for part of the internet.

The RPKI Validator checks an IP address, prefix or AS number against the validated RPKI data: which ROAs cover it, whether the origins seen in BGP are VALID, INVALID or NOT FOUND, which upstream providers an AS has authorised with ASPA, and whether observed AS paths are consistent with those authorisations.

What is RPKI?

In simple terms

RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) lets the holder of IP addresses publish signed statements about how they may be routed. A ROA (Route Origin Authorization) says "AS X may announce this prefix, up to this length". An ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) says "these ASes are my upstream providers". Networks use this data to reject announcements that contradict it.

Technical background

The five Regional Internet Registries operate trust anchors. Relying-party software (rpki-client, Routinator, OctoRPKI and others) downloads all published objects, verifies the signatures and outputs validated payloads: VRPs (prefix, maxLength, origin ASN) and validated ASPA records. Routers then apply route origin validation as defined in RFC 6811. ASPA path verification is specified in draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.

Why use an RPKI validator?

It answers in seconds the questions that otherwise need several portals: is my prefix covered by a ROA, is the origin I announce authorised, will a more-specific announcement be INVALID, and do my upstreams match the ASPA I published? Checking before a change avoids self-inflicted outages, and checking after one confirms that the new ROAs are visible in the validated data.

Who should use it?

Network engineers at ISPs, hosting providers and enterprises with their own address space; NOC staff investigating partial reachability; security teams looking into possible hijacks or route leaks; and anyone preparing to create ROAs or ASPA records for the first time.

How the RPKI validator works

NetTools downloads the validated dataset published by rpki-client.org, covering all five RIRs and rebuilt about every 10 minutes. It uses compression and "only if changed" requests, keeps only the latest copy and indexes it locally for fast lookups. Route origin validation follows RFC 6811 exactly: a ROA covers a route when its prefix contains the route, and matches when the origin AS is the same and the route is no longer than maxLength. Live routes and AS paths come from RIPE RIS through RIPEstat; their RPKI status is computed by NetTools, and RIPEstat's own verdict is shown only for comparison. The BGP Looking Glass shows the same routes in more detail, and the ASN Lookup shows registration data.

How to use the NetTools.tech RPKI Validator

  1. Open the RPKI Validator and enter an IP address, a prefix such as 1.1.1.0/24, or an AS number such as AS13335.
  2. Optionally enter an origin ASN to check whether that AS may originate the prefix — useful before announcing it.
  3. Click Validate RPKI. The input type is detected automatically.
  4. Read the overview, then switch between ROA / Prefix validation, ASPA / Upstream authorization and ASN overview.
  5. Export the result as PDF, CSV or JSON, or print it.

Understanding the results

The RPKI status is VALID, INVALID or NOT FOUND. For INVALID results, the explanation says whether the origin AS is not authorised, the prefix is longer than maxLength, or both. The ROA table lists every covering ROA (exact or less specific) and, for prefixes, more-specific ROAs inside it. The live routes table shows each origin seen in BGP with the NetTools verdict next to RIPEstat's. The ASPA tab shows the providers an AS has authorised and verifies observed AS paths hop by hop; a path is labelled Valid, Invalid, Unknown, or relationship-dependent when the upstream and downstream rules disagree. The data status shows when the dataset was generated and whether it is current, delayed or stale.

Example: a more-specific announcement turns INVALID

An operator holds 203.0.113.0/22 with a ROA for AS64500, maxLength /22, and starts announcing 203.0.113.0/24 for traffic engineering. Entering the /24 with origin AS64500 shows INVALID — "prefix longer than the ROA's max length". The fix is to create a ROA for the /24 (or raise maxLength to 24 if every /24 inside the /22 is really announced) before announcing it.

Common use cases

  • Checking ROA coverage before announcing a new prefix or moving it to another AS.
  • Explaining why a route is dropped by some networks but not by others.
  • Verifying that a newly created ROA has reached the validated data.
  • Reviewing an AS's announced prefixes for INVALID routes.
  • Comparing observed upstreams with the providers listed in an ASPA record.

Troubleshooting

INVALID – origin AS not authorised

The ROA names a different AS. Create a ROA for the AS that actually originates the prefix (or announce from the authorised AS), and remove stale ROAs.

INVALID – prefix longer than maxLength

Create a ROA for the more-specific prefix, or raise maxLength — only as far as you really announce, because a generous maxLength makes forged-origin sub-prefix hijacks easier.

NOT FOUND

No ROA covers the prefix. Create one in your RIR's portal; until then RPKI cannot protect the prefix.

A new ROA is not visible yet

Publication and validation take time. Check the dataset generation time shown on the page and look again after the next refresh.

ASPA path marked relationship-dependent

Look at the hop table: a "Not Provider+" hop means an AS's ASPA does not list the next AS as a provider. If that AS really is a provider, add it to the ASPA.

Common mistakes

  • Setting maxLength to /32 or /48 "just in case", which allows forged-origin sub-prefix hijacks.
  • Forgetting a ROA for the more-specific prefixes used for traffic engineering or DDoS mitigation.
  • Leaving ROAs for an old origin AS after migrating to a new provider.
  • Publishing an ASPA that omits one of the actual upstream providers.
  • Treating a missing ASPA record as a misconfiguration.

Limitations

Validation uses a single validated dataset (rpki-client.org); other validators may differ briefly after changes. Live routes come from RIPE RIS collectors and are not a complete view of the global routing table. ASPA verification follows an IETF draft that may still change, and because a collector does not know the business relationship of its peers, some path results are relationship-dependent. Country information for ASNs is shown only where the data source provides it.

Security & privacy

The tool is read-only and cannot announce or change routes. Inputs are limited to public IP addresses, prefixes and AS numbers and are rate-limited. The only download is the fixed rpki-client.org dataset; nothing you enter is stored.

  • BGP Looking Glass — current routes, AS paths and collectors for any prefix.
  • ASN Lookup — registration details for an autonomous system.
  • IP Lookup — network, AS and location for an address.
  • Whois Lookup — registry records for IP blocks and domains.

Summary

RPKI only protects your routes when ROAs match what you announce and, increasingly, when ASPA records list your real providers. The NetTools.tech RPKI Validator checks both against current validated data, explains every INVALID result and shows exactly which ROA or ASPA hop is responsible.

Frequently asked questions

What do VALID, INVALID and NOT FOUND mean?

VALID: a ROA authorises the origin AS for the prefix and its length. INVALID: ROAs cover the prefix, but none authorises that origin AS, or the announcement is more specific than the ROA's maxLength. NOT FOUND: no ROA covers the prefix, so RPKI neither confirms nor rejects it.

Why is my route INVALID because of the prefix length?

A ROA's maxLength limits how specific an announcement may be. If the ROA says 203.0.113.0/22 with maxLength 22 and you announce a /24 out of it, the /24 is INVALID. Raise maxLength or create a ROA for the /24 — but only for prefixes you actually announce.

Is a missing ASPA record a problem?

No. ASPA is still an IETF draft and only a few thousand networks publish records. A missing record makes the affected hop Unknown, never Invalid.

Why does a path show “depends on the relationship”?

ASPA verification uses different rules for routes received from customers or peers and for routes received from providers. A route collector does not know which applies, so NetTools shows both results and gives a single verdict only when they agree.

Why can NetTools and RIPEstat disagree?

They use different validators with different refresh times. Right after a ROA change one may already see it and the other not yet. The generation time of the NetTools dataset is shown with every result.

Does RPKI stop all hijacks?

No. Route origin validation stops announcements with the wrong origin AS where networks enforce it. A hijacker who forges a path that ends in the right origin AS is not caught by ROV — that is what ASPA path verification addresses.