When the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) became public in December 2021, the hardest question for many teams was not how to patch it. It was simpler and more embarrassing: do we even use Log4j, and where? The library was rarely a direct dependency. It came in three or four levels deep, through frameworks, agents and vendor products, and nobody had a list.
A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) is that list. Today we are adding a tool that reads one and tells you what it means for security: the SBOM Security Analyzer.
What the SBOM Security Analyzer does
Drop a CycloneDX or SPDX file onto the page, paste it, or try the built-in example. The analyzer combines three things in one workspace:
- An SBOM analyzer — metadata (format, author, generating tool, creation time), every component with its version, ecosystem, supplier, licenses, PURL and CPE, and quality checks that tell you what is missing.
- A vulnerability scanner — known CVEs for the packages, with severity, CVSS details, CWE, the CISA KEV flag and the first fixed version where NVD states one.
- A dependency graph — which components are direct dependencies of your application and which arrive transitively, and the exact path through which a vulnerable package enters.
Supported formats are CycloneDX 1.2–1.6 in JSON or XML and SPDX 2.2/2.3 in JSON, up to 25 MB and 20,000 components per file.
Your SBOM stays in your browser
An SBOM is a detailed map of your software. Uploading it to a third party is something many security teams are not allowed to do, so the analyzer is built around that:
- The file is parsed in your browser. It is never uploaded, and nothing from it ends up in the page URL.
- For vulnerability matching, only package identifiers are sent to the NetTools server: name, version, PURL, CPE and ecosystem — one entry per unique package, in small batches. No file names, descriptions, hashes, internal references or the dependency structure.
- Components without a version or without a PURL/CPE are decided locally and not sent at all.
- The scan exists only in memory on the server and is deleted when you press Clear analysis, or at the latest an hour after it finishes.
How matching works — and why some packages say "Unable to determine"
Guessing is the easy way to produce an impressive-looking vulnerability report. Matching packages to CVEs by name alone produces plenty of findings, many of them for a different product that happens to share a name. The analyzer never does that. Every component gets one of these results:
| Result | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Exact match | The SBOM contains a CPE with a version; NVD evaluates that CPE directly. |
| Strong match | The package name and version were found in NVD's CPE dictionary and the vendor or ecosystem is consistent (for example the node.js target for an npm package). |
| Possible match | NVD knows the product name, but the vendor is ambiguous or the ecosystem is not confirmed. Shown, counted at half weight in the risk score, and clearly labelled. |
| No known CVEs | NVD lists no vulnerability for this version. |
| Unable to determine | No version, no PURL or CPE, or NVD has no CPE for the package. |
NVD itself decides whether the installed version falls inside each CVE's affected range. The fixed version comes from the same data — the versionEndExcluding boundary of the matched product — and the component view combines them into one recommended version that fixes every CVE it can.
Expect a fair number of "Unable to determine" results, especially for small npm packages and Go modules hosted on GitHub. NVD describes products, not package registries, and many packages simply have no CPE. We prefer saying so to inventing a match.
A walkthrough with the example SBOM
Click Try an example on the analyzer page. The example is a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM for a small Node.js application, my-app, with real npm packages at deliberately old versions:
my-app 1.0.0
├── express 4.17.1
│ └── lodash 4.17.20
├── axios 0.21.1
│ └── follow-redirects 1.14.7
├── @babel/core 7.20.0
│ ├── json5 2.2.1
│ └── lodash 4.17.20
└── internal-lib (no version, no PURL)Within a second the Overview shows 7 components, 4 direct and 3 transitive dependencies, and 8 dependency relationships. The quality checks already flag problems before any CVE lookup: internal-lib has neither a version nor a package identifier, so it cannot be checked, and one dependency in the file points to a component that is not in the SBOM.
The vulnerability check then runs in the background and results appear as each package is resolved. When we ran the example on 21 October 2026, six packages were checked against NVD: five were strong matches with known CVEs, @babel/core 7.20.0 had none, and together they produced 37 findings (CVE × component). Your numbers will differ as NVD's data changes — nothing in the report is precomputed.
Clicking express 4.17.1 opens its details: the NVD CPE used for matching, the path my-app → express, three CVEs (CVE-2022-24999, CVE-2024-29041 and CVE-2024-43796) with fixed versions 4.17.3, 4.19.2 and 4.20.0, and therefore a recommended version of 4.20.0. Selecting lodash in the Dependency graph highlights the route through which it enters the application — useful when you need to know which direct dependency to upgrade to get rid of a transitive one.
Reading the risk score
The overview shows a single SBOM security risk score from 0 to 100. It is a NetTools assessment, not an industry standard, and the formula is printed next to it:
- each finding counts Critical 10, High 5, Medium 2, Low 0.5 and unscored 1 point,
- ×1.5 when the component is a direct dependency,
- +5 when the CVE is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog,
- possible matches count half,
- score = 100 × (1 − e^(−points / 50)).
The curve flattens deliberately: the difference between 0 and 3 critical CVEs matters far more than the difference between 30 and 33. Components that could not be checked are listed separately and do not lower the score — "we don't know" is not the same as "safe".
From the SBOM to the CVE record
Every finding has a View CVE button that opens the full record in CVE Search — NVD and CNA scores side by side, the CVSS breakdown, affected products, references and EPSS. When the CVE page is opened from the analyzer, it also shows a Detected in your SBOM box with the component, installed version, fixed version, dependency type and path. That information is kept only in your browser tab.
How to get an SBOM
Most build ecosystems can produce one in a single command. A few common generators:
# Node.js project (CycloneDX)
npx @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm --output-file sbom.json
# Any directory or container image (CycloneDX via Syft)
syft . -o cyclonedx-json=sbom.json
# Filesystem scan with Trivy
trivy fs --format cyclonedx --output sbom.json .Vendors increasingly ship SBOMs with their products too. In the United States, Executive Order 14028 (2021) pushed SBOMs into federal software procurement, and the EU Cyber Resilience Act requires manufacturers of products with digital elements to draw one up as part of their technical documentation. If a supplier gives you an SBOM, the analyzer is a quick way to see what it actually contains.
What it does not do (yet)
This is the first stage of the tool, and its limits are worth knowing:
- One vulnerability source. Only NVD is queried. Ecosystem databases such as OSV or GitHub security advisories are not used yet, which is the main reason many packages are "Unable to determine".
- Speed depends on NVD. NVD rate-limits its API; small SBOMs finish in seconds, large ones can take minutes. Up to 5,000 unique packages are checked per scan.
- No reachability analysis. A CVE in a component does not mean your application uses the vulnerable function. The analyzer shows that a known-vulnerable version is present — whether it is exploitable in your setup is still your call.
- Fixed versions only where NVD states them. Nothing is inferred, and the recommended version is based on version numbers, not compatibility testing.
Try it
Open the SBOM Security Analyzer, click Try an example, and then load an SBOM from one of your own projects. For a complete reference to every field, status and option, see the SBOM Security Analyzer guide.