A message from a colleague arrives in spam, its headers full of ARC-Seal and ARC-Message-Signature lines, and the Authentication-Results say dmarc=fail. Did a mailing list break it? Did the gateway seal it? Is the chain even valid? Reading ARC headers by hand means unfolding long lines, matching instance numbers and checking signatures you cannot verify in your head.
The ARC Chain Analyzer does that work: it rebuilds the ARC sets, checks the structure against RFC 8617, verifies the signatures with the keys published in DNS, and shows what each intermediary reported — hop by hop.
What is an ARC chain?
In simple terms
Every intermediary that supports ARC — a mailing list, forwarder or gateway — adds a numbered set of three headers: what it saw, a signature over the message, and a seal over everything recorded so far. Together these sets form a chain from the first intermediary to the last.
Technical background
RFC 8617 defines the instance tag i= (1 for the first set, then 2, 3 …), the ARC-Authentication-Results (the results observed), the ARC-Message-Signature (a DKIM-style signature with bh= for the body) and the ARC-Seal, which signs all previous ARC sets plus its own and declares cv= none, pass or fail. A verifier checks every seal, but only the newest message signature.
Why use an ARC chain analyzer?
It separates what is merely present from what is proven: header presence, set structure, instance sequence, cv= consistency, seal signatures, the newest message signature and the reported authentication results are evaluated separately, so a chain is never called valid just because ARC headers exist.
Who should use it?
Postmasters investigating rejected forwarded mail, administrators configuring trusted ARC sealers, list operators checking their own seals, and anyone comparing what different intermediaries reported about a message.
How the ARC chain analyzer works
The input is uploaded in small pieces and analysed in stages. Header fields are parsed with the mailauth library's RFC 5322 and tag parsers. ARC sets are grouped by instance and checked for completeness, sequence, duplicates, required tags and cv= rules. Each signature's own key is looked up at selector._domainkey.domain. The cryptographic checks are done by mailauth, a maintained RFC 8617 implementation: every ARC-Seal on its own, and the newest ARC-Message-Signature when the complete message is supplied. For the other headers of the same message, the Email Header Analyzer shows the delivery path.
How to use the NetTools.tech ARC Chain Analyzer
- Open the message source in your mail client (Gmail: Show original; Outlook: View message source).
- Copy everything into the ARC Chain Analyzer, or open a saved .eml file.
- Click Analyze ARC Chain.
- Read the final result and the stage strip, then select a hop in the chain diagram to see its headers and tags.
- Review cryptographic verification, reported results and forwarding diagnostics, and export the report if needed.
Understanding the results
The final result is one of: ARC chain valid, invalid, incomplete, partially verified, no ARC chain found or unable to verify. Each signature is reported as cryptographically verified, cryptographically invalid, or not verified with the reason — missing message data, unsupported algorithm or key lookup failure. Reported results show SPF, DKIM and DMARC per hop with the identity evaluated, so you can see where a result changed.
Example: a mailing list breaks DKIM
The first set (i=1) was added by a mailing list and reports SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass. The list added a subject tag; the gateway behind it (i=2) reports DKIM and DMARC fail and arc=pass. Both seals verify. The analyzer reports "DKIM failed after a modification" and "ARC preserved earlier results": a receiver that trusts the list's seal can deliver the message despite the DMARC failure.
Common use cases
- Finding out why forwarded or list mail failed DMARC.
- Checking a gateway's ARC seal before adding it as a trusted sealer.
- Confirming that a mailing list seals correctly.
- Comparing what several intermediaries reported.
Troubleshooting
“Not verified — message data missing”
Only headers were provided. Upload the complete raw message to verify the newest message signature.
“Key lookup failed” or “no key published”
The sealer's key is not in DNS now. It may have been rotated since delivery; the chain can no longer be verified.
Body hash mismatch
The body differs from what was signed — modified later, or not copied byte-exact. Use "Download original" rather than copying from the reading pane.
Chain incomplete
A header is missing, often because a mail client shortened the header view. Use the raw source.
Common mistakes
- Reading cv=pass as proof that the chain is valid.
- Treating ARC-Authentication-Results as verified facts.
- Expecting older ARC-Message-Signatures to verify after later modifications.
- Copying headers from a formatted view that drops or rewraps lines.
- Assuming a valid chain will be trusted by every receiver.
Limitations
Keys are looked up at analysis time, not delivery time. Without the body, the newest message signature cannot be verified. Seals with cv=fail are not cryptographically verified, because the chain had already failed. At most 20 different keys are looked up per analysis, and inputs are limited to 1 MB. Whether a receiver trusts a sealer cannot be seen from the message — the ARC Checker covers a domain's readiness instead.
Security & privacy
The input is held in memory for the analysis only, never logged or stored, and deleted when the result is ready. Exports contain header fields and findings, not the body. Only the keys named by the ARC signatures are looked up, through public resolvers; nothing else is fetched.
Related tools
- ARC Checker — check a domain's ARC readiness.
- Email Header Analyzer — delivery path and authentication results.
- DKIM Checker — inspect any DKIM key.
- DMARC Checker — check a domain's DMARC policy.
Summary
An ARC chain only means something when its structure and signatures check out. The NetTools.tech ARC Chain Analyzer verifies what can be verified with the input you provide, says clearly what could not be, and shows hop by hop how authentication changed on the way.
Frequently asked questions
Why is the newest ARC-Message-Signature “not verified”?
It covers the message body. With headers only, its body hash cannot be checked. Paste or upload the complete raw message to verify it.
Does cv=pass mean the chain is valid?
No. cv= is what the sealer declared about the chain it received. The analyzer verifies the seals itself and reports when the declaration and the verification disagree.
Why are older ARC-Message-Signatures not verified?
RFC 8617 validates only the newest one. Older ones are expected to break as soon as a later hop changes the message — which is the reason ARC exists.
Can I trust the SPF and DKIM results in the chain?
They are assertions by each intermediary. They are only as trustworthy as the sealer, and the final receiver decides whether to trust it.
Why did a seal fail that passed at delivery?
Keys are looked up now. If the sealer has rotated or removed its key since, an old chain can no longer be verified.
Is my email stored?
No. The input is kept in memory only for the analysis and deleted as soon as the result is ready. Reports contain header fields and findings, not the message body.