You published a TLSA record for your mail server, and a sending provider starts deferring mail with "TLSA record does not match certificate". Or you renewed a certificate and suddenly mail from DANE-enabled senders stops. DANE protects SMTP against downgrade and impersonation — but only when DNSSEC, the TLSA records and the live certificate all agree.
The DANE / TLSA Record Checker finds your MX hosts, validates the DNSSEC chain from the root itself, connects to each mail server with STARTTLS, and checks every TLSA record against the certificate the server actually presents, using the rules for its certificate usage.
What is DANE?
In simple terms
DANE lets you publish, in DNS, which certificate or key your mail server uses. DNSSEC signs that information, so a sending mail server can check that it is talking to your real server over an encrypted connection — and refuse to deliver if not.
Technical background
DANE is defined in RFC 6698, updated by RFC 7671; RFC 7672 applies it to SMTP. A TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx-host> contains a certificate usage (0 PKIX-TA, 1 PKIX-EE, 2 DANE-TA, 3 DANE-EE), a selector (0 full certificate, 1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo), a matching type (0 exact, 1 SHA-256, 2 SHA-512) and the association data. A TLSA RRset is only usable when DNSSEC validation of it is secure; a bogus or failed lookup makes senders treat the server as unreachable.
Why use a DANE checker?
A TLSA lookup tool only shows that a record exists. A wrong digest, a missing DNSSEC link, a server without STARTTLS or a DANE-TA record whose CA is not sent in the chain all look fine in DNS but stop delivery from DANE-capable senders. The checker reproduces what such a sender does.
Who should use it?
Mail server administrators deploying or maintaining DANE, hosting providers operating MX clusters, anyone rotating certificates on servers that publish TLSA records, and security teams verifying that SMTP transport security is in place.
How the DANE checker works
NetTools queries the MX records, then validates DNSSEC itself from the root: trust anchor, DNSKEY, DS and RRSIG at every level, with NSEC or NSEC3 proofs when records do not exist. For each MX host it validates the address and TLSA records, then an isolated worker connects to each IPv4 address on the SMTP port, sends EHLO and STARTTLS, records the TLS version and the exact certificate chain the server presents, and quits — no mail is sent. Each TLSA record is then evaluated by usage: DANE-EE matches the server's own key; DANE-TA requires the trust anchor in the chain, verifies every signature and validity period down to the server certificate, and checks the name against the MX host and email domain. The DNSSEC Checker analyses a zone's signing in more depth.
How to use the NetTools.tech DANE / TLSA Record Checker
- Open the DANE / TLSA Record Checker and enter your email domain.
- Optionally open Advanced to test a specific SMTP host, port or IP address.
- Click Check DANE and follow the eight stages.
- Read the overall result and the card for each MX host; open the sections for DNSSEC, TLSA records, SMTP, certificates and matching.
- Use the TLSA Record Generator to calculate a record from a certificate, and export the report.
Understanding the results
Each MX host gets one of six results. DANE VALID: DNSSEC-secure TLSA records authenticate the certificate. DANE INVALID: secure records exist but the certificate or STARTTLS fails them. DANE INSECURE: TLSA records exist without a valid DNSSEC chain. DANE NOT CONFIGURED: no TLSA record. DANE INDETERMINATE: DNSSEC validation failed or could not be completed. DANE UNREACHABLE: the server or its certificate could not be reached. Every TLSA record is shown with its own result, including records that do not match.
Example: a renewed certificate with a new key
The MX host publishes 3 1 1 for the old key. After a renewal that generated a new key, the checker reports DANE INVALID: the record's SHA-256 differs from the SPKI digest calculated from the live certificate, which it shows side by side. The fix is to publish the new 3 1 1 record — the checker suggests it from the live certificate — wait two TTLs, and remove the old one. Next time, publish the new record before installing the certificate.
Common use cases
- Verifying a new DANE deployment before announcing it.
- Checking every MX host and address after a certificate renewal.
- Diagnosing deferrals from DANE-enabled providers.
- Generating TLSA records from a certificate.
- Confirming DNSSEC is intact for the TLSA records.
Troubleshooting
DNSSEC INSECURE or BOGUS
Sign the zone and publish the DS record at your registrar, or fix expired signatures; see the chain section for the failing level.
TLSA does not match the certificate
Publish a record for the certificate in use, keeping the old record during a rollover.
DANE-TA fails although the hash matches
The server must send the CA certificate in its chain, and the certificate must carry the MX host or email domain name.
STARTTLS not advertised
Enable STARTTLS — a server with secure TLSA records must support TLS.
Common mistakes
- Publishing TLSA records in a zone without DNSSEC.
- Installing a new key before publishing its TLSA record.
- Using DANE-TA without sending the CA certificate.
- Publishing PKIX usages 0 or 1 for SMTP.
- Looking up
_25._tcp.<domain>instead of the MX host.
Limitations
The checker tests from one location over IPv4; IPv6 addresses are listed but not tested. At most five MX hosts and two addresses per family are checked. Keys and certificates are evaluated now, not at the time of earlier deliveries. PKIX validation for usages 0 and 1 uses the public CA store of the probe server.
Security & privacy
Only public addresses of the MX hosts on SMTP ports are contacted, with EHLO, STARTTLS and QUIT only — never MAIL, RCPT, DATA or AUTH. Probes run in isolated workers with time limits and per-server budgets. The TLSA generator runs in your browser and never publishes anything.
Related tools
- DNSSEC Checker — full chain-of-trust analysis of a zone.
- MTA-STS Checker — the policy-based alternative to DANE.
- SMTP Test — connect to a mail server and see its responses.
- Email Deliverability Checker — the complete sending setup.
- SSL Checker — certificates on HTTPS servers.
Summary
DANE only protects mail when DNSSEC, TLSA records and the live certificate agree. The NetTools.tech DANE / TLSA Record Checker validates all three the way a DANE-capable sender does, explains each record's result and helps you publish and roll over TLSA records safely.
Frequently asked questions
Does a TLSA record mean DANE works?
No. The TLSA record must be authenticated by a valid DNSSEC chain, the server must offer STARTTLS, and the certificate it presents must satisfy the record. The checker tests all three.
Which TLSA record should I publish for my mail server?
RFC 7672 recommends 3 1 1 (DANE-EE, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, SHA-256). The second choice is 2 0 1 (DANE-TA, the issuing CA certificate, SHA-256), with that CA certificate included in the server's chain.
Why is the TLSA record looked up for the MX host, not my domain?
Sending servers connect to the MX hosts, so DANE for SMTP is evaluated per MX host name: _25._tcp.<mx-host>. A record at _25._tcp.<your domain> only matters if the domain itself is the mail server.
Why are usages 0 and 1 shown as not for SMTP?
RFC 7672 says SMTP clients may treat PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1) as unusable, because mail servers have no common list of trusted CAs. The checker still evaluates them for information.
My server was unreachable — is DANE broken?
Not necessarily. The checker reports DANE UNREACHABLE when it cannot connect or complete TLS; that is different from DANE INVALID, where the certificate does not satisfy the records.
Does DANE-EE ignore an expired certificate?
Yes. With usage 3 the key binding is authenticated by DNSSEC, so expiry and names are not checked (RFC 7672 §3.1.1). Other senders may still check them, so renew certificates anyway.
Is IPv6 tested?
IPv6 addresses are listed, but the NetTools probe server has no IPv6 connectivity yet, so they are marked as not tested.