DNSSEC Checker
AvailableCheck DNSSEC for any domain: chain of trust from the root, DS and DNSKEY matching, cryptographic RRSIG validation, NSEC/NSEC3, every name server and fixes for each problem.
Check DNSSEC
- 1. Resolving domain
- 2. Discovering DNS delegation
- 3. Checking parent-zone DS records
- 4. Retrieving authoritative DNSKEY records
- 5. Validating RRSIG signatures
- 6. Verifying the DNSSEC chain of trust
- 7. Checking denial-of-existence records
- 8. Running additional DNSSEC diagnostics
- 9. Generating the final report
DNSSEC overview
Chain of trust
Each zone must be vouched for by the one above it: the parent’s signed DS record points to the child’s key, and that key signs the child’s records. Select a level for details.
Details
— Findings & recommendations
— DS records (parent zone)
— DNSKEY records
— RRSIG signatures
— NSEC / NSEC3 (denial of existence)
— Name servers & resolvers
— Algorithms
— Raw DNS data
How it works
NetTools queries the root servers, the TLD servers and the domain’s own name servers directly (no recursive resolver in between) and validates every step itself: the root keys against the IANA trust anchor, each DS record against the parent’s signed keys, each DNSKEY set against its DS, and the zone’s signatures cryptographically (OpenSSL). It also checks a negative answer (NSEC/NSEC3), queries every authoritative name server separately and compares the verdict with Cloudflare, Google and Quad9 validating resolvers.
What the statuses mean
- SECURE — every step from the root trust anchor to the domain validates.
- INSECURE — the domain (or a zone above it) is not signed: there is no DS record in the parent. Answers work but are not authenticated. This is not an error.
- BOGUS — a DS record says the zone is signed, but keys or signatures do not validate. Validating resolvers return SERVFAIL, so the domain fails for their users.
- WARNING — validation succeeds, but there are weaknesses such as deprecated algorithms, signatures close to expiry or inconsistent name servers.
- UNKNOWN — servers did not answer, so validation could not be completed. That is a reachability problem, not a DNSSEC verdict.
How NetTools validates
- The root keys are checked against the IANA trust anchor (KSK-2017 and KSK-2024 DS digests). The DO bit only asks servers to include DNSSEC records — the signatures are then verified here with OpenSSL (RSA, ECDSA P-256/P-384, Ed25519, Ed448).
- Queries go straight to the root, TLD and authoritative servers without recursion, so a resolver’s cache cannot hide a problem. The verdict is then compared with Cloudflare, Google and Quad9; any disagreement is shown, not hidden.
- Negative answers are tested with one random name. No zone transfers and no name guessing are performed.
Safeguards & responsible use
- Only the submitted public domain is examined: internal and reserved TLDs are refused, and name servers that point to private, loopback or link-local addresses are never contacted.
- At most 220 queries and 30 seconds per analysis, 2.5 s per query, one analysis per visitor at a time and per-client rate limits. No zone transfers, no brute-force name discovery — one random name is used to test negative answers.
- Results are kept in memory for 15 minutes and not stored.
Learn more
What is DNSSEC Checker?How it works, how to read the results, troubleshooting and FAQs. Complete guide →Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between INSECURE and BOGUS?
INSECURE means the domain is simply not signed (no DS record in the parent) — answers are not authenticated, but they resolve normally. BOGUS means DNSSEC is expected (a DS exists) but validation fails, so validating resolvers return SERVFAIL and the domain stops working for their users.
Where do I fix a DS record?
The DS record lives in the parent zone (e.g. .com) and is set at your registrar, usually in the domain’s DNSSEC settings. Your DNS provider shows the DS values to enter. NetTools can read the parent zone but has no access to your registrar account.
Does a short signature lifetime mean a problem?
Not by itself. Online signers such as Cloudflare create signatures valid for a day or two and refresh them continuously. NetTools warns only when less than 3 days and less than a quarter of the validity window remain.
Is NSEC a vulnerability?
No. NSEC lets anyone list the names in a zone, which is a privacy consideration, not a flaw in DNSSEC. NSEC3 (with 0 iterations and no salt, per RFC 9276) or compact denial make listing harder.